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Abstract
We study donation-based crowdfunding for threshold public good provision. Our
main focus is on an extension with refund bonuses aimed at resolving the problems
of equilibrium coordination and free riding. In the case of insufficient contribu-
tions, contributors not only have their contributions refunded but they also receive
refund bonuses proportional to their pledged contributions. Thus, refund bonuses
encourage more contributions but ultimately enough is raised given sufficient pref-
erence for the public good and in equilibrium no bonuses need to be paid. We test
the predicted effects of refund bonuses in an experiment using a laboratory-based
crowdfunding platform that features many main aspects of real-life platforms. Our
main empirical result is that refund bonuses substantially increase the rate of fund-
ing success when contributors can support multiple projects. Furthermore, our
findings also demonstrate that refund bonuses lead to significant economic gains
even after accounting for their costs.
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1 Introduction
The tragic collapse of Genoa’s Morandi bridge in Italy in August, 2018 is a showcase
of many problems associated with the centralized provision of public goods. Investi-
gations report inadequate infrastructure funding, lack of accountability, allegations of
mismanagement and corruption.1 Experimentation with alternative forms of public fi-
nance management, e.g., fiscal federalism or privatization of public services, is yet to
demonstrate sustained improvement in public good provision (Bardhan and Mookher-
jee (2006), Hodge (2000)). But with environmental challenges added to the pool of
collective-action problems, there is a growing need for new solutions to public funding.
The early successes of crowdfunding and crowdsourcing in providing public goods
captured the attention of policy makers (World Bank (2013), Gabison (2015)). The
Wikipedia project rendered expensive, state-funded national encyclopedias obsolete. With
governments in impasse over global environmental issues, the $20-million Ocean Cleanup
mission, funded by voluntary contributions, is on its way to remove plastic from the
oceans. In the United Kingdom, an increasing number of cancer patients seek to crowd-
fund their treatment, so bypassing inefficient services of national public healthcare.2 On
Internet crowdfunding platforms communities, schools, free software developers, artists,
environmentalist groups, political parties raise donations for public projects and causes.
Even governments resort to crowdfunding. In 2008, London’s Metropolitan Police Service
launched the MetPatrol Plus program which offers commercial districts and communities
a possibility to crowdfund hires of police officers whose numbers were reduced in response
to budgetary cuts.3 Finally, crowdfunding’s operation on a peer-to-peer basis without in-
termediation is considered particularly advantageous in developing countries as a way of
bypassing their institutional inefficiencies (World Bank (2013)).
This paper is concerned with the problem of improving donation-based crowdfunding
1“Italy’s crumbling infrastructure under scrutiny after bridge collapse” by Lorenzo Tondo, The
Guardian, 17 Aug 2018; “Italy bridge collapse: furious ministers blame highways firm” by Angela Giuf-
frida and Lorenzo Tondo, The Guardian, 15 Aug 2018; “A deadly bridge collapse points to Italy’s
structural weaknesses” The Economist, 18 Aug 2018.
2“Private cancer therapy crowdfunding rise” http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-38858898, 4 Feb 2017.
3“How to hire your own London policeman” The Economist, 15 Dec 2016.
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for the purpose of threshold public good provision. In its current practice, donation-
based crowdfunding remains fraught with the same problems that most decentralized
methods of public good provision face – in particular, multiple equilibria and free riding.
In a typical “all-or-nothing” crowdfunding campaign – in the language of economics,
the provision point mechanism – contributions are pledged over a pre-specified period of
time. If an announced target is met then the funds pledged are released to the project
developer; otherwise, the contributors are fully refunded. Because of the equilibrium
coordination problem and subsequent free riding, an immediate prediction about “all-or-
nothing” crowdfunding is a high occurrence of low-contribution outcomes.4 Furthermore,
according to Kuppuswamy and Bayus (2018), an important factor of a campaign’s success
is the fundraiser’s social circle, where many contributions typically originate, adding to
the limitations of crowdfunding for public projects.
This paper investigates, empirically and theoretically, contributing behavior toward
public goods under conditions very close to those of “all-or-nothing” crowdfunding. For
this purpose, we created a laboratory-based crowdfunding platform that features many
important and realistic elements of crowdfunding in practice. This platform allows asyn-
chronous contribution pledges over continuous time, upward pledge revisions, and con-
stant updating of individual and aggregate pledge amounts until a fixed deadline. It can
simultaneously accommodate multiple fundraising campaigns and also allows for different
crowdfunding campaign designs.
The main emphasis of our work is on the modification of the “all-or-nothing” crowd-
funding mechanism that is proposed by Zubrickas (2014) and further explored by Cason
and Zubrickas (2017). The modification is to introduce refund bonuses payable to con-
tributors in the event of an unsuccessful fundraising campaign.5 As an example, consider
a $10,000 crowdfunding campaign to renovate a park. The crowdfunding platform, e.g.,
4This prediction finds strong empirical support. As of October 2018, one of the most popular plat-
forms, Kickstarter, reports a success rate of 36.43% for the total of its 420,650 launched projects. Out
of 264,908 unsuccessfully funded projects, 55,322 (21%) received 0% funding and 166,401 (63%) received
between 1% to 20% funding. According to The Verge (2013), the success rate of Indiegogo, another
popular crowdfunding platform, is only 10%.
5The idea similar to refund bonuses first appeared in Tabarrok (1998) in the form of dominant
assurance contracts applied to collective action problems with binary choice.
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Kickstarter, promises that if the funding threshold of $10,000 is not met the platform
not only refunds the contributors their contributions but also gives them refund bonuses
proportional to their contributions pledged, e.g., 10% of their contributions. As shown
in Zubrickas (2014), refund bonuses provide incentives for more contributions and ulti-
mately these incentives, together with contributors’ preference for the public good, ensure
that in equilibrium enough is raised without any bonuses paid. This modification not
only eliminates inefficient equilibria but also reduces the set of efficient equilibria because
refund bonuses create more opportunities for profitable deviations, which results in a
fewer combinations of contributions that can be sustained as equilibria. From the con-
tributors’ perspective, refund bonuses give contributors assurance that they will receive
a positive return from contributing – either from the public good or from refund bonuses
– whereas free riders may end up with nothing.
The findings of Cason and Zubrickas (2017), which is the first experimental study on
refund bonuses, considered only a static (simultaneous contributions) environment and
provide further motivation for the present study.6 First, Cason and Zubrickas (2017)
demonstrate that experimental subjects respond to incentives created by refund bonuses
in predicted ways. For example, and counter to simple intuition, project funding rates
decline if the refund bonus is set very high. This is consistent with equilibrium predic-
tions. Most importantly, they also demonstrate that refund bonuses have the potential
to achieve a higher success rate compared to the standard “all-or-nothing” mechanism
without bonuses. These earlier findings provide less direct support for the usefulness of
refund bonuses for practical applications, which is a primary goal of the present paper.
Refund bonus mechanisms do not yet exist on crowdfunding platforms, so it is impor-
tant to study whether they can increase funding and economic returns in more realistic
dynamic environments. We find that in the setting with multiple funding campaigns, the
6Besides considering only simultaneous contributions, the experiment in Cason and Zubrickas (2017)
employed an environment that is considerably different from the one studied here and from crowdfunding
in practice. In Cason and Zubrickas (2017) contributors could only pledge support for one project at a
time, they could not add additional contributions to this project, and they faced no aggregate uncertainty
since the total value of the project was known and unchanging across periods. Treatments in that study
included only large refund bonuses (25, 50 and 75%) to explore some counter-intuitive predictions of the
mechanism’s equilibria.
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introduction of refund bonuses increases the success probability from 30% to 60% and
yields significant economic gains even after accounting for refund bonus costs. While in
the paper we do not explicitly model sources of refund bonuses, we consider a specific
example where the crowdfunding platform pays for refund bonuses out of fee surcharges
levied from successful campaigners.7 With calculations based only on the intensive mar-
gin of contributions, we show that a 6% surcharge can be sufficient for the refund bonus
scheme to be self-sustainable.
Compared to the levels of coordination reported by Cason and Zubrickas (2017),
adding a (continuous) time dimension for contributions results in higher levels of coordi-
nation under the standard “all-or-nothing” mechanism but only for single-project condi-
tions. The equilibrium coordination problem resurfaces in full when subjects can choose
among several projects, however, as we observe more failed campaigns and relatively low
total contributions without refund bonuses. Nevertheless, the impressive performance of
the mechanism extended with refund bonuses remains robust to the presence of alter-
native projects. Another finding is that the introduction of refund bonuses can change
the pattern of contributions over time as aggregate contributions accumulate more slowly
under conditions with refund bonuses.
Our empirical findings are consistent with theoretically predicted contributing behav-
ior. We develop a model of “all-or-nothing” crowdfunding that allows for refund bonuses.
The model belongs to the class of models of dynamic provision of discrete public goods.
Following the related literature (Kessing (2007); Choi et al. (2008); Battaglini et al.
(2014, 2016); Cvitanic and Georgiadis (2016)), our modeling approach uses Markovian
(payoff relevant) strategies to characterize equilibrium contributions.8 The distinctive
feature of our model is that, in line with the practice of crowdfunding, contributions are
refunded in the case of the campaign’s failure; that is, contributions are only made in the
event of success. This feature implies linear costs and no discounting and, as a result, has
important implications for strategic interactions between individual continuation contri-
7Another example of a refund bonus source is a third-party donor, perhaps introduced as seed funding.
8In addition, Choi et al. (2008) and Battaglini et al. (2016) demonstrate a close match between
equilibrium Markovian strategies and empirically observed contributions.
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butions and aggregate accumulated contribution. In particular, Kessing (2007) shows
that with discrete public goods aggregate and individual contributions are strategic com-
plements as a larger aggregate contribution implies a higher probability of success and, in
turn, a higher marginal value of further contributions (also see Cvitanic and Georgiadis
(2016)). However, we show that strategic complementarity is attenuated by the condition
that contributions are refunded in the case of failure, i.e., they are not sunk. While addi-
tional contributions increase the probability of success, they also decrease the probability
of failure and, thus, of obtaining contribution refunds. Hence, refunds affect the value
function of the project, which now bears some resemblance to a value function for con-
tinuous public good projects. The implication is that, drawing on Fershtman and Nitzan
(1991), individual and aggregate contributions can become strategic substitutes. The
introduction of refund bonuses shifts the balance more toward strategic substitutability,
which can explain our empirical finding about the slower accumulation of contributions
under refund bonuses.
The motivation to include multiple projects that can receive contributions comes pri-
marily from the actual practice of crowdfunding. From a theoretical perspective, adding
a new project does not change the equilibrium outcomes but it can change their focal-
ity. Specifically, Bagnoli and Lipman (1989) show that the trembling-hand refinement
can only eliminate low-contribution equilibrium outcomes under single- but not multiple-
project conditions. This theoretical distinction has significant practical implications. The
follow-up experimental studies of Bagnoli and McKee (1991) and Bagnoli et al. (1992)
demonstrate lower efficiency rates for multiple public good projects. Recently, Corazzini
et al. (2015) and Ansink et al. (2017) have confirmed the same outcome of lower
provision rates for multiple public goods.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model,
dynamic contribution problem, and its solution. Based on our theoretical model, we
formulate testable hypotheses in Section 3. In Section 4 we present the design of the
experiment and discuss its results in Sections 5 and 6. In Section 7 we discuss additional
related literature. Section 8 concludes the study.
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2 Model
Consider a set N of agents, indexed by i ∈ N , that can benefit from a public good
project.9 Each agent i has a privately known valuation for the public good which is given
by vi. It is common knowledge that individual valuations are independently distributed
over [v, v] according to a distribution F (.) with the density function f(.).
The project costs C to implement. The fundraising campaign runs over a fixed period
of time [0, T ]. During any moment of time agents can pledge contributions toward the
project. If at the end of the campaign the sum of contributions falls short of the target
C, then the contributions are refunded together with refund bonuses as a share r ≥ 0
of the contributions pledged; otherwise, the contributions are collected and the project
is implemented. Contributions exceeding C are not refunded and do not affect project
quality (i.e., they are wasted).
2.1 Static Contribution Problem
For the subsequent analysis of the dynamic contribution problem, it is useful first to
summarize the main results of the static model presented in Zubrickas (2014). Without
refund bonuses, r = 0, besides equilibria with a positive probability of provision there
are also equilibria that have the zero probability of provision. For example, the zero-
contribution outcome is equilibrium and so is any combination of contributions that sum
up to less than C−vmax, where vmax is the highest valuation in the group. The introduc-
tion of refund bonuses eliminates the equilibria with the zero probability of provision as
otherwise agents could gain in utility by marginally increasing their contributions and,
thus, their refund bonuses.
Refund bonuses also have other effects. Refund bonuses not only eliminate inefficient
equilibria but they also reduce the set of efficient equilibria. Refund bonuses create
9In Section 6, we discuss the case when the agents can simultaneously fund multiple projects.
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possibility for profitable deviations and, therefore, in equilibrium each contributor needs
to obtain a sufficiently large net utility from the public good. This implies that fewer
combinations of contributions can be sustained as equilibria. For instance, in the case of
no aggregate uncertainty there exists a bonus rule that uniquely implements the public
good. In the case of aggregate uncertainty, which is the case studied here, bonuses that
are too large may reduce the probability of provision. Intuitively, at low realizations of
valuations such that their aggregate V has V < C(1 + r), agents prefer refund bonuses,
which are rC in total at the limit, over the net utility of the project, V − C.10
2.2 Dynamic Contribution Problem
In the model, we consider Markovian (payoff-relevant) strategies and abstract from any
signaling considerations that preceding play may entail. Let gi(t) denote agent i’s total
contribution made from the start of the campaign up to time t and, respectively, let
G(t) denote the aggregate contribution of all agents, G(t) =
∑
i gi(t), and G−i(t) the
aggregate contribution of the agents other than i, i.e., G−i(t) =
∑
j 6=i gj(t). At every
moment of time t each agent i observes the aggregate contribution G(t) and can make an
additional contribution ai(G(t), gi(t), vi, t) ≥ 0 as a function of G(t), gi(t), own valuation
vi, and time t that maximizes his expected payoff after accounting for strategies of other
agents {aj(G(t), gj(t), vj, t)}j 6=i. We note that individual total contribution gi(t) is a
state variable because it is not a sunk cost as it is repaid in the event of the campaign’s
failure and it also determines the amount of refund bonus. We refer to function ai(.) as
a Markovian strategy.11
We express agent i’s problem as choosing strategy ai(G(t), gi(t), vi, t) such that at
10In our experiment, we adopt the framework where the public good project is (almost) always efficient
to implement even after accounting for refund bonuses, i.e., V > (1 + r)C.
11Our exposition of the dynamic problem closely follows Cvitanic and Georgiadis (2016). Besides
refund bonuses, another difference is that in our model contributions are actually made only in the event
of success which implies linear costs and no discounting. These observations have important consequences
for the solution of the model.
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every t it maximizes the value function
Ji(ai(.), {aj(.)}j 6=i) =
∫ T
t
−ai(G(t′), gi(t′), vi, t′)dt′ + (1)
+ (1− Pr(G(T ) < C | G(t)))(vi − gi(t)) +














ai ≥ 0 and initial conditions G(t) = g and gi(t) = gi, i ∈ N . (4)
Above, Pr(G(T ) < C | G(t)) is the probability that the aggregate contribution G(T ) falls
short of the target conditional on G(t) raised at time t. The integrand of the first term of
the value function J(.) stands for the instantaneous utility of an additional contribution.
The rest of the value function gives the expected scrap value which is either the net utility
from the project or the utility from refund bonuses with the continuation contribution
gi(T )− gi(t) refunded (the refund of gi(t) is already accounted for). The side constraints
describe the evolution of the state variables.
We predict that the outcome of the fundraising campaign is Markov Nash equilibrium
(MNE) defined as
Definition 1. A profile of Markovian strategies {a∗i (G(t), gi(t), vi, t)}i∈N is Markov Nash
equilibrium if at every moment t ∈ [0, T ] the strategy a∗i (G(t), gi(t), vi, t) is a solution to
(1)-(4) given {a∗j(G(t), gj(t), vj, t)}j 6=i for all admissible initial conditions G(t) and gi(t),
i ∈ N .
Similar to the static case, we can immediately observe that low-contribution outcomes
with the zero probability of provision can be equilibrium for r = 0, e.g., a∗i = 0 for all i
and t. With r > 0, however, such outcomes are not equilibria because any agent could
increase his contribution and, subsequently, refund bonus. For the remainder of this
section, we restrict attention to equilibria with a positive probability of provision.
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2.3 Equilibrium Characterization
First, we observe that only total contributions matter for payoffs and not their dynamics
over time, as the costs of contributions are linear and are payable only at the end of the
campaign conditional on its success. Specifically, integrating the side constraint (2) yields






′)dt′ ≡ gTi (G(t), gi(t), vi, t), (5)
and the side constraint (3) can be accordingly expressed as
G(T ) = G(t) +
∑
i
gTi (G(t), gi(t), vi, t). (6)
Using (5) and (6), we can transform agent i’s problem, where at every moment of time
t each agent i chooses continuation contribution gTi (G(t), gi(t), vi, t) to maximize his ex-
pected payoff given by
J̃i(g
T
i (.), {gTj (.)}j 6=i) = (1− Pr(G(T ) < C | G(t))) (vi − gi(t)− gTi (.)) + (7)
Pr(G(T ) < C | G(t)) r(gi(t) + gTi (.))
subject to (6) and initial conditions G(t) and gi(t), i ∈ N . (8)
Second, at any moment of the campaign we can determine the equilibrium conditional
probabilities of success and failure using the dynamic consistency of equilibrium play and
that the initial condition G(t) needs to lie on the admissible path. Letting H(.) be the
distribution of equilibrium aggregate contribution G(T ), we have by Bayes’ rule that the
probability of failure conditional on G(t) raised until time t is determined by
Pr(G(T ) < C | G(t)) = H(C)−H(G(t))
1−H(G(t))
. (9)
Then, the problem presented in (7)–(8) can be viewed as a static Bayesian game
where agent i’s strategy is a continuation contribution gTi (G(t), gi(t), vi, t) which is a
function of previous aggregate and own contributions and of own valuation, respectively.
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At any moment t the solution to the initial program (1)–(4) determines the continuation
contributions that are a solution to the static fundraising game for the remainder of the
funds required, C −G(t), with the players’ beliefs about the probability of success being
consistent with the equilibrium play up to time t. We summarize these observations in
the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Suppose that {a∗i (G(t), gi(t), vi, t)}i∈N is Markov Nash equilibrium. Then,
the resultant continuation contributions {gT∗i (G(t), gi(t), vi, t)}i∈N , defined by (5), form a
Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the fundraising game, where for every t the players pledge
contributions for the remainder C−G(t) and their beliefs about the failure probability are
consistent with past contributions as determined by Bayes’ rule in (9).
2.4 Equilibrium Properties
According to Proposition 1, a profile of Markov strategies is Markov Nash equilibrium only
if it forms a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the static contribution game. One outcome
of this observation is that our findings about the static contribution model presented
earlier also apply to the dynamic contribution problem. Next, we consider Bayesian Nash
equilibria with a positive probability of provision in order to characterize comparative
statics properties of equilibrium continuation contributions at any time t, which will form
a basis for empirical analysis. The properties established below apply to all Bayesian Nash
equilibria and, therefore, can be used to characterize equilibrium Markovian strategies.
For subsequent analysis it is useful to replace the state variableG(t) with the aggregate
contribution of agents other than i, G−i(t), since we have that G−i(t) = G(t)− gi(t). Let
H−i(.) be the distribution of the equilibrium total contribution G∗−i(T ) of the other agents.
We can rewrite the problem in (7)–(8) so that the equilibrium continuation contribution
gT∗i (G−i(t), gi(t), vi, t) or just g
T∗
i for brevity maximizes agent i’s expected payoff from
11
time t onwards determined by
Ui(g
T
i , {gTj }j 6=i;G−i(t), gi(t), vi) =
1−H−i(C − gTi − gi(t))
1−H−i(G−i(t))
(vi − gTi − gi(t)) + (10)
H−i(C − gTi − gi(t))−H−i(G−i(t))
1−H−i(G−i(t))
r(gTi + gi(t)).
Assuming differentiability, we have that the non-zero equilibrium contributions are de-
termined by the first-order condition which, premultiplied by 1−H−i(G−i(t)), reads as
− (1−H−i(C − gT∗i − gi(t))) + h−i(C − gT∗i − gi(t)) (vi − gT∗i − gi(t)) − (11)
h−i(C − gT∗i − gi(t)) r(gT∗i + gi(t)) + (H−i(C − gT∗i − gi(t))−H−i(G−i(t))) r = 0
where h−i(.) is the density function of the distribution H−i(.).
Implicitly differentiating the condition in (11), we can establish several properties of
equilibrium contributing behavior. First, not surprisingly, the continuation contribution
gT∗i increases in own valuation for the public good:
dgT∗i
dvi






where we use that ∂2Ui/∂(g
T
i )
2 < 0 by the second-order condition. Second, we obtain that











In words, own previous and further contributions are perfect substitutes, and the reason
is that previous contributions are not sunk costs and have the same effect on payoffs as
any further contribution.








For r = 0, the individual would not change his planned contribution against changes
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in G−i(t) as he expects others to contribute more if they previously contributed less
and vice versa. For r > 0, however, the derivative in (12) is negative, which indicates
substitutability between individual continuation contributions and previous contributions
of others. The degree of substitutability is inversely related to the refund bonus rule r,
which, intuitively, is due to stronger incentives to miss the target for larger refund bonuses.
We also note that for r < 0, which implies that a part of contribution is sunk, we obtain
strategic complementarity between individual contributions and aggregate contribution
in line with the results of Kessing (2007) and Cvitanic and Georgiadis (2016).
In general, our finding in (12) can be related to other findings from the literature on
the dynamic provision of public goods. Whether own contribution and the previous con-
tributions of others are strategic complements or substitutes depends on the type of the
public good. In particular, for continuous public goods there is strategic substitutability
(Fershtman and Nitzan (1991)), whereas for discrete goods there is strategic complemen-
tarity (Kessing (2007)). Intuitively, with continuous public goods and a concave utility
an additional contribution reduces the marginal value of subsequent contributions, thus,
yielding strategic substitutability. By contrast, with discrete public goods an additional
contribution increases the probability of provision and, thus, the marginal value of sub-
sequent contributions, yielding strategic complementarity. Even though in the present
paper we deal with discrete public goods, the introduction of refunds and refund bonuses
implies that the project generates payoffs not only upon completion, which makes the
value function look more like in the case of a continuous public good though preserving
a discontinuity at the point of provision.
Our preceding analysis is about individual continuation contributions rather than the
dynamics of individual contributions. Given that the costs of contribution are linear and
conditional, there are multiple Markov Nash equilibria that can be consistent with the
same total contributions including, e.g., equilibria with open-loop strategies or degen-
erate equilibria where everyone contributes at the very last moment of the campaign.
Furthermore, we also note that in a dynamic setting the existence of multiple equilibrium
outcomes can result in a richer strategy set than that given by Markov (payoff relevant)
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strategies. This observation becomes particularly relevant in the presence of multiple
projects as discussed in Section 6.
3 Empirical Implications
This section draws on the implications of the model to formulate testable hypotheses
about contributing behavior. We are interested in comparing (i) the performance of
mechanisms with and without refund bonuses and (ii) predicted and observed contribu-
tion patterns.
Hypothesis 1. The introduction of refund bonuses increases the rate of provision.
This hypothesis is based on the observation that refund bonuses eliminate equilibria with
low contributions and, thus, those with a zero rate of provision. In a static (simultaneous-
contribution) environment, a similar hypothesis was tested in Cason and Zubrickas (2017).
Their finding is that in larger groups (10 experimental subjects) the rate of provision
significantly drops in treatments without refund bonuses compared to treatments with
refund bonuses. Here we test this hypothesis in a more realistic dynamic environment
also allowing for multiple project alternatives.
In campaigns without refund bonuses, we can distinguish two sources of failure. The
first is low-contribution equilibria, and the second is the problem of coordination among
efficient equilibria. However, in campaigns with refund bonuses we have only the second
source of failure. The next hypothesis follows from the observation that in campaigns
without refund bonuses both sources of failure play a role.
Hypothesis 2. The contribution target is missed by larger amounts under the mecha-
nism without refund bonuses than with refund bonuses.
The next two hypotheses are about patterns of individual contributions as predicted
by equilibria with a positive probability of provision. When comparing equilibrium con-
tributions between treatments with and without bonuses, we restrict the set of outcomes
only to successful campaigns. This is done to remove the outcomes of inefficient equilibria
that can arise under the mechanism without refund bonuses.
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Hypothesis 3. Conditional on successful campaigns, individual continuation contribu-
tions positively depend on own valuation and negatively on own previous contribution.
Hypothesis 4. Conditional on successful campaigns, under the mechanism with (with-
out) refund bonuses the previous aggregate contribution of others has a negative (neutral)
effect on individual continuation contributions.
Hypothesis 4 follows from our finding, presented in (12), that previous contributions of
others have a negative impact on individual continuation contributions but only under the
mechanism with refund bonuses. Because of this strategic substitutability, we conjecture
that contributions accumulate more slowly under the mechanism with refund bonuses:
Conjecture. Conditional on successful campaigns, contributions accumulate more slowly
under the mechanism with refund bonuses.
4 Experimental Design
We controlled subjects’ preferences over funding public goods, termed ‘projects’ in the
instructions, using randomly drawn induced values. It was common knowledge that all
N = 10 subjects received an independent value for each project every period drawn
from U [20, 100].12 Actual drawn values vi were private information. The threshold for
funding each project was fixed at C = 300 experimental dollars. The average aggregate
project value across all 10 contributors (600) far exceeds the project cost, and the realized
minimum aggregate proejct value (based on the actual individual random draws) was 469.
Therefore, all projects were efficient to fund. If the group’s aggregate contributions during
the two-minute funding window reached the C = 300 threshold, every group member
received his or her drawn value for that project irrespective of their own contribution.
Contributions in excess of the threshold were not refunded and they did not improve the
quality of the project. Excess contributions were simply wasted. Therefore, net subject
12The choice of N = 10 for the group size is motivated in part by experimental evidence that achieving
efficiency in public good provision with a group size of 10 can be as challenging as with larger groups;
see, e.g., Diederich et al. (2016).
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earnings for successfully funded projects equalled their drawn value minus their own total
contribution.
Like most crowdfunding mechanisms in the field, the contribution mechanism operated
in continuous time, with a hard close and full information about aggregate contributions
at all times. While the two-minute timer counted down in one-second increments, any
subject could submit a contribution. These contributions were instantly displayed to
all nine others in the group on an onscreen table listing.13 Subjects could make as
many contributions, in whatever amounts they desired, during the two-minute window.
Consistent with actual crowdfunding schemes, contributions could not be withdrawn. In
addition to the table listing each individual contribution, subjects’ screens displayed the
total contribution sum raised at that moment, next to the target contribution threshold
(300). The screen also continuously updated the subject’s own total contribution for the
period, summed across their individual contribution amounts.
The experiment employed a 2 × 3 design, and within subject treatment variation.
The first treatment variation concerns the availability of alternative projects for potential
contributions, in order to investigate whether coordination difficulties caused by multiple
projects affect the performance of refund bonuses. In some periods subjects could only
contribute towards one project, while in other periods subjects could contribute to two
projects during the same time window. Their value draws for these two projects were
independent. Both projects or one project could be funded successfully. The second
treatment variation was the availability and amount of the refund bonus, r ∈ {0, 0.1, 0.2},
with r = 0 being the no bonus baseline. Under the mechanism with a positive refund
bonus r, the individual’s total contribution gi determines her net earnings for the period
in the event that aggregate total contributions G do not reach the threshold C. To
summarize, subjects earnings for every project are determined by 1G≥C(vi−gi)+1G<C rgi.
As noted above, we varied the treatment conditions within subjects. We chose this
13This individualized contribution listing indicates the distribution of contributions at each point
in time. This is a simple approximation to the information provided by online crowdfunding sites,
where many projects display how many individual contributions fall into various ranges. Furthermore,
displaying individual contributions has no theoretical implications because of the aggregative structure
of the public good game, i.e., the distribution of others’ contributions does not matter as long as their
aggregate is the same.
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Table 1: Experimental Design
Values v Periods 1-15 Periods 16-30 Num. Subjects Num. Groups
U [20, 100] r1 = 0, r2 = 0.1 Only r = 0.2 20 2
U [20, 100] r1 = 0, r2 = 0.2 Only r = 0.1 20 2
U [20, 100] r1 = 0.1, r2 = 0.2 Only r = 0 20 2
U [20, 100] Only r = 0 r1 = 0.1, r2 = 0.2 20 2
U [20, 100] Only r = 0.1 r1 = 0, r2 = 0.2 20 2
U [20, 100] Only r = 0.2 r1 = 0, r2 = 0.1 20 2
design in part because of our relatively large (N = 10) group size, which limited the
number of independent groups given the subject payment budget. The within subject
design shown in Table 1 generates data with and without alternative projects available for
all 12 groups, and includes all three refund bonus treatments in every group. Each session
began with 15 periods in one treatment followed by one treatment switch before the final
15 periods. The ordering of treatment conditions varies across different sessions to avoid
an ordering confound in the treatment comparisons. Half of the sessions began with only
one project available to fund, while the other half began with two project alternatives. We
did not include alternative projects with identical refund bonuses, or both with no refund
bonus, because previous research (Corazzini et al. (2015); Ansink et al. (2017)) has
already investigated coordination and contributions to multiple projects with similar or
identical characteristics. Two groups of ten subjects (fixed matching within ten-subject
groups) participated in each of the six treatment ordering configurations, for a total of
120 subjects in the experiment.
All sessions were conducted at the Vernon Smith Experimental Economics Laboratory
at Purdue University, using z-Tree (Fischbacher (2007)). Subjects were undergraduate
students, recruited across different disciplines at the university by email using ORSEE
(Griener (2015)), and no subject participated in more than one session.
At the beginning of each experimental session an experimenter read the instructions
aloud while subjects followed along on their own copy. Appendix A presents this exact
instructions script. Earnings in the experiment are denominated in experimental dol-
lars, and these are converted to U.S. dollars at a pre-announced 50-to-1 conversion rate.
Subjects are paid for all project rounds and also received a $5.00 fixed participation pay-
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ment. Subjects’ total earnings averaged US$24.25 each, with an interquartile range of
$20.00 to $27.50. Sessions usually lasted about 90 minutes, including the time taken for
instructions and payment distribution.
5 Experimental Results
We report the results in four subsections. The first subsection considers the main treat-
ment effects, specifically the funding rate and individual contributions for the different re-
fund bonus conditions. The data indicate that treatment differences emerge most strongly
when multiple projects are available for funding, which we explore further in the second
subsection and in Section 6. The third subsection reports individual contributions within
the continuous time contribution window, and how they depend on the bonus rate and
previous contributions within the period. The final subection presents additional results
on the contribution dynamics.14
5.1 Main Treatment Effects
Funding rate
The overall project funding rate is about 40 percent in the baseline condition without
refund bonuses. This success rate increases to about 50 percent with the smallest (0.10)
refund bonus rate, and further to about 60 percent with the larger (0.20) bonus rate.
Figure 1 illustrates that these increases in project funding due to the refund bonus oc-
cur only when alternative projects are available for contributions. Without alternative
projects to fund, the funding rate without refund bonuses is similar to those projects
with bonuses. That is, the data support Hypothesis 1 only when alternative projects are
available.
14In one session the subjects in one group were clearly confused in the first period, as they contributed






























Figure 1: Overall project funding rates by treatment condition. Error bars indicate
standard error of the mean.
Result 1. Refund bonuses increase the rate of provision and individual contributions
only when multiple projects are available to receive contributions. Contributions also
increase in the aggregate and individual valuation of the project, but are not affected by
the existence or level of the alternative project’s refund bonus.
Support. Table 2 reports random effects regressions of project funding outcomes (columns
1 and 2) and individual contributions (columns 3 and 4) on exogenous treatment variables
and the randomly-drawn project valuations. These regressions and the others reported
later account for the panel nature of the dataset, with subject or session random effects
and robust standard errors clustered on sessions to account for non-independence of ob-
servations across periods and individual subjects within sessions or across projects. The
regressions also control for (insignificant) experience and time trends. The omitted treat-
ment is the zero bonus baseline. The treatment dummies for the positive refund bonuses
are only statistically significant with alternative projects available (columns 2 and 4).
Funding success and individual contributions also increase when the drawn project val-
uations are greater, indicating that this voluntary contribution mechanism is able to
identify and fund the more worthy projects. Clearly the decisions to finance alternative
projects are not independent of each other, but importantly the lower rows of the table
indicate that funding rates and individual contributions are not lower when the alter-
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native project has a positive refund bonus. Only the individual subjects’ value for the
alternative project has a negative impact on contributions.
Table 2: Funding Success and Individual Contributions
Funding Success (Logit) Individual Contributions
No Alternatives w/Altern. No Alternatives w/Altern.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dummy (bonus=0.1) -0.114 0.200** 0.429 4.926**
(0.086) (0.061) (0.814) (1.465)
Dummy (bonus=0.2) 0.046 0.260** 1.041 5.523**
(0.052) (0.079) (0.624) (1.146)
Total Value 0.002** 0.002**
(0.0007) (0.0004)
Own Value 0.295** 0.379**
(0.021) (0.020)
Period -0.010 -0.005 0.048 0.088
(0.006) (0.008) (0.086) (0.104)
Dummy (Periods 16-30) -0.093 -0.064 0.317 1.145





Dummy (Alt. bonus=0.1) 0.002 0.662
(0.059) (1.127)




Observations 179 360 1790 3600
Note: Random-effects regressions, with standard errors clustered by sessions; robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses. Marginal effects shown for logit models. ** indicates coefficient is significantly
different from zero at the .01 level; * at .05.
The next result considers outcomes for unsuccessful projects. Inefficient, low-contribution
equilibria exist only for the mechanism without refund bonuses, so Hypothesis 2 postu-
lates that the contribution target of 300 is missed by larger amounts without refund







































Figure 2: Average amount short of threshold for unsuccessful projects, by treatment
condition. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean.
treatment, refund bonuses raise average contributions closer to the threshold.
Result 2. For projects that are not funded successfully, refund bonuses raise average
contributions closer to the funding threshold only when multiple projects are available to
receive contributions.
Support. Figure 2 shows that when no alternative projects are available to receive
contributions, on average unsuccessful projects fall short of the funding threshold by
the highest amount (38) when no refund bonuses are offered, but this average is not
significantly higher than the average (28 − 31) with refund bonuses. When alternatives
projects are available, however, contributions fall short of the target of 300 by 90 on
average without bonuses, which is statistically and economically much greater than the
levels for unsuccessful projects with refund bonuses.15
Generally, Results 1 and 2 suggest a role for refund bonuses in resolving the equi-
librium coordination problem. With a single project, we observe that both mechanisms
produce a similar rate of provision and average contributions and, as implied by Result
2, low-contribution equilibria do not seem to play a role under zero bonus conditions.
Put differently, if low-contribution equilibria are not focal, their elimination by refund
15These statistical conclusions are based on tobit models that control for experience and time trends,
and robust standard errors clustering on sessions.
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bonuses should not produce any effect. As discussed in Section 5.4, a time window for
contributions is particularly useful for zero bonus campaigns where contributions tend
to accumulate more quickly, thus, helping individuals coordinate on efficient outcomes.16
However, with multiple projects low-contribution equilibria seem to have an effect under
zero bonus conditions as judged by the significantly lower rate of provision and contri-
butions. In Sections 5.2 and 6, we argue that the necessity to coordinate over multiple
projects exacerbates the equilibrium coordination problem under zero bonus conditions.
Lastly, we also note that the size of refund bonuses matters for success in the predicted
way. It is in line with the argument that larger refund bonuses reduce the set of efficient
equilibria which facilitates equilibrium coordination (see Section 2.1).
Funding efficiency
Our final results for the main treatment comparison concern overall funding efficiency
and net returns. Due to the drawn individual values for the different projects, some have
a greater social value V than others. We define funding efficiency as [V −G(T )]/[V −C]
when the project is funded (G(T ) ≥ C) and 0 otherwise. It is an index that ranges
from 0 for unsuccessful projects to 1 for those projects whose total contributions G(T )
exactly reach the threshold C. Excess contributions above C, which are common due
to miscoordination, lower this index below one. Refund bonuses paid for r > 0 on
unsuccessful projects do not factor into funding efficiency, since these are simply transfers
and do not affect total surplus.
We also use an alternative performance index, termed net return (NR), to penalize
the outcome from the mechanism designer’s perspective when refund bonuses are paid.
NR(G(T ), r) =
 V −G(T ) if G(T ) ≥ C−rG(T ) if G(T ) < C
16The 58 percent success rate without refund bonuses when no alternatives are available compares
favorably to the 20-30 percent success rate for the 10-contributor, no refund case in Cason and Zubrickas
(2017) with single, simultaneous contribution opportunities. Although this improvement could be due to
improved coordination from the continuous contribution window, it could be due to other environment
differences in the two experiments noted above in footnote 6.
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This simply replaces the social value for successful projects with the refund bonuses
that have to be paid by the mechanism designer when fundraising is unsuccessful. By
definition, of course, these net returns can only be negative when refund bonuses can be
paid (r > 0).
Result 3. Funding efficiency increases monotonically with the amount of the refund
bonus rate r, but only when multiple projects are available to receive contributions. Net
returns are also significantly greater than the r = 0 baseline for the high refund bonus
r = 0.2 when alternative projects are available, but are significantly lower than the r = 0
baseline for the low refund bonus r = 0.1 when no alternative projects are available.
Support. Table 3 reports average funding efficiency and net returns for each of the
treatments. None of the efficiency figures shown in the first column are significantly
different from each other for the case where no alternative projects are available for
funding. By contrast, the monotonic increase in efficiency with alternatives available, as
the refund bonus rises from 0 to 0.1 to 0.2, are all significantly different at 1 percent.17 The
net returns average 158 with the high refund bonus r = 0.2 when alternative projects are
available to fund, which exceeds the 101 average without refund bonuses at the 5 percent
level. Without alternative projects, the net returns of 192 without refund bonuses exceed
the 129 average returns for the small refund bonus r = 0.1.18
While refund bonuses can be overall welfare improving, an interesting question is
whether a for-profit crowdfunding platform would consider introducing refund bonuses.
Let us consider the case when the crowdfunding platform levies a surcharge fee on suc-
cessful projects and pays for refund bonuses out of its increased revenue. In the current
practice, crowdfunding platforms typically keep 5% of contributions of successful cam-
paigns, which in our example with alternative projects would generate an expected profit
of 0.05× 0.300× 310 = 4.65 per campaign, where 310 is the average total contribution in
successful campaigns. The question is what is the smallest surcharge sr that makes the
17These statistical conclusions are based on tobit models that control for experience and time trends,
and robust standard errors clustering on sessions.
18Conclusions are based on a regression with experience and time controls, with robust standard errors
clustered on sessions.
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Table 3: Average Funding Efficiency and Net Returns
Funding Efficiency Net Returns
No Alternatives w/Altern. No Alternatives w/Altern.
No Refund Bonus (r = 0) 0.567 0.300 192.3 101.0
(0.062) (0.041) (21.9) (14.1)
Refund Bonus r = 0.1 0.437 0.487 129.4 138.6
(0.061) (0.044) (22.8) (15.5)
Refund Bonus r = 0.2 0.585 0.575 172.3 158.1
(0.060) (0.043) (24.3) (16.7)
Observations 179 360 179 360
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
scheme with refund bonus r generate the same expected profit of 4.65 per campaign. For
the 10% bonus rule, we obtain the surcharge of s0.1 = 6.2% and for the 20% bonus rule
it is s0.2 = 10.5%.
19 We should also note that our calculation of surcharges is based only
on the intensive margin of contributions studied in the experiment. Higher success rates
could also attract more campaigns and, as a result of a higher extensive margin, would
require even smaller break-even surcharges.
To summarize these main treatment effects, we generally see that mechanism perfor-
mance is improved with refund bonuses, but only when contributors have more than one
project that they can fund. For this case, refund bonuses increase the rate of project
provision, raise aggregate and individual contributions, raise average contributions closer
to the funding threshold when fundraising is unsuccessful, and increase funding efficiency
and net returns to the public good. Based on the intensive margin of contributions, a
refund bonus scheme can be self-sustainable with a surcharge of as low as 6%.
5.2 Multiple Projects for Funding
Crowdfunding sites offer potential contributors multiple projects to fund, which can make
coordination among potential contributors difficult (Corazzini et al. (2015)). Compe-
tition between multiple charities can also affect relative and total giving, depending on
19The surcharge s0.1 is found from (0.05 + s0.1)× 0.487× 310− 0.1× 0.513× 260 = 4.65, where 260 is
the average total contribution in unsuccessful campaigns with the 10% bonus rules. We find s0.2 in an
analogous way.
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whether affected projects are complements or substitutes (Filiz-Ozbay and Uler (2018)).
Details of the funding mechanism can also differ across projects, and across crowdfunding
platforms, which is a key reason that we included treatments in this experiment in which
multiple projects featuring different refund bonuses could be funded simultaneously. As
just noted, performance differences emerge in the environment with multiple projects.
Models (2) and (4) shown earlier in Table 2 indicate that conditional on having alter-
native projects to fund, the level of the alternative projects’ refund bonus did not affect
funding likelihood or individual contributions. Here we turn to examine more closely
whether the presence of alternative projects and their refund bonus levels affect contribu-
tions and funding. The top panel of Table 4 displays marginal effects from logit models
of the likelihood of funding success, pooling across standalone projects and projects so-
liciting contributions while other projects are available.
The dummy variable shown in the top row indicates that when pooling across all
treatments (model 1), having multiple projects to fund modestly reduces the chances
of reaching the funding threshold, with marginal statistical significance. The other two
columns consider different subsets of treatments. Model (2) indicates that r = 0 projects
without any refund are significantly less likely to be funded when an alternative r = 0.1
project is available for contributions, compared to standalone r = 0 projects without
alternatives. A similar result (not shown) obtains when a no-bonus project is paired with
an alternative paying a r = 0.2 bonus. In terms of raw numbers, for the 57 cases in which
only one project is funded and an r = 0 project is one of the alternatives, the r > 0
project is funded in 44 cases (77 percent) and the r = 0 project is funded only 13 times.
By comparison, model (3) indicates that projects with the low r = 0.1 bonus are not
negatively affected by being paired with projects offering a higher r = 0.2 bonus. Similar
regression results, not shown in the table, indicate that the r = 0.1 treatment is not
negatively affected by pairing with the no-bonus treatment, and that the r = 0.2 project
funding likelihood is also not affected by the availability of alternative projects.
The lower panel of Table 4 displays analogous results for total and individual contri-
butions. Models (4) and (7) replicate the earlier treatment effects documenting greater
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Table 4: Impact of Multiple Projects for Funding
Panel A Funding Success
(Logit, marginal effects) Any r = 0 vs. r = 0.1 vs.
Alternatives r = 0, 0.1 r = 0.1, 0.2
(1) (2) (3)
Dummy (Multiple Projects) −0.063† -0.218** 0.024
(0.034) (0.077) (0.090)






Observations 539 120 120
Panel B Individual Contributions Total
Any r = 0 vs. r = 0.1 vs. Contributions
Alternatives r = 0, 0.1 r = 0.1, 0.2
(4) (5) (6) (7)
Dummy (Multiple Projects) -1.580** -4.195** -0.313 -18.02**
(0.449) (1.429) (0.604) (4.539)
Total Value 0.159**
(0.026)
Own Value 0.356** 0.346** 0.330**
(0.014) (0.040) (0.019)
Dummy (bonus=0.1) 3.206** 32.06**
(0.632) (6.40)
Dummy (bonus=0.2) 4.004** 40.11**
(0.634) (6.53)
Constant 4.20** 6.16† 8.80** 168.60**
(1.23) (3.66) (1.56) (17.21)
Observations 5390 1200 1200 539
R-squared 0.188 0.196 0.166 0.231
Notes: Random-effects regressions, with standard errors clustered by sessions; robust standard errors
are reported in parentheses. Time trend (period) and treatment sequence controls included in all models.
** indicates coefficient is significantly different from zero at the .01 level; * at .05; † at 0.10.
contributions with positive refund bonuses, and also show that contributions fall when al-
ternative projects are available.20 Models (5) and (6) illustrate that this negative impact
20The stronger statistical significance for contributions (column 7 in Panel B) relative to funding
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of multiple projects is limited to the no-bonus case. Other comparisons for r > 0 projects,
as in column (6), never indicate significant negative impacts of project alternatives. To
summarize:
Result 4. Projects without refund bonuses (r = 0) receive lower contributions and
are less likely to be funded successfully when they solicit contributions while alternative
projects are simultaneously available for funding. Projects with refund bonuses (r > 0)
are unaffected by the availability of alternative projects.
In Section 6, we give an explanation for the asymmetric effect of multiple projects on
funding success and contributions across different treatments. With multiple projects,
the necessity to coordinate between and within projects makes the task of coordination
more difficult. The previous result, however, suggests that refund bonuses help coor-
dinate contributions under such conditions. We will present evidence for conditionally
cooperative behavior, and show that it arises only under no bonus and multiple-project
conditions. At the same time, such behavior can be supported as equilibrium only in the
presence of multiple equilibrium outcomes – as in the case of no bonuses.
5.3 Individual Contributions in Successful Projects
The next set of empirical results concern the pattern of individual contributions as pre-
dicted by equilibria with a positive probability of provision. Accordingly, we restrict
attention to the projects that were successfully funded. Hypothesis 3 postulates that
individual continuation contributions gTi in the later phase of the period depend posi-
tively on the contributor’s own valuation for the project, and negatively on their own
previous contribution made up to that point in the period. This is because own previous
and further contributions are perfect substitutes. The data support this hypothesis, as
summarized in the next result. Hypothesis 4 is that individual continuation contributions
success (column 1 in Panel A) may be due to the greater variance in funding success. As documented
below in subsection 5.4, success often occurs through a flurry of contributions in the final seconds. Thus,
the exact timing of these final contributions makes the success outcome quite stochastic.
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depend negatively on the aggregate previous contributions of others, but only for the case
of positive refund bonuses. Without bonuses, others’ previous contributions should have
a neutral impact. The data support only the zero refund bonus part of this hypothesis.
Result 5. Individual continuation contributions in the later part of the contribution
period depend positively on a contributor’s value for the project, and negatively on own
previous contributions. This contribution pattern holds for zero and positive refund bonus
conditions, with and without alternative projects available for funding. A negative but
statistically insignificant relationship exists between individual continuation contributions
and previous contributions of others in the period.
Support. We wish to estimate how individual i’s continuation contributions in period
t, gTit , depend on own previous contributions up to that point in the period (git), the
aggregate contributions of others up to that point (G−it) and the individual’s own value
draw for that period (vit). When assessing these relationships it is important to account
also for the amount remaining to reach the target at that point, Rt = C − git − G−it,
where C = 300 is the threshold for funding. We therefore would like to estimate the
following linear regression, which also includes a time trend and individual fixed effects
to absorb systematic differences between subjects:
gTit = β0(C − git −G−it) + β1git + β2G−it + β3vit + β4t+ αi + εit
The key parameters of interest for evaluating Hypotheses 3 and 4 are β1, β2 and β3.
This equation cannot be estimated directly due to perfect colinearity, however, since the
funding threshold C = 300 is a constant. So instead we estimate a transformed version,
gTit = β0C + (β1 − β0)git + (β2 − β0)G−it + β3vit + β4t+ αi + εit
The estimates from this transformed equation can be converted back into the original β1
and β2 terms using β0, with corresponding adjustments to the standard errors.
Table 5 reports the results of this estimation exercise, with different treatment condi-
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tions reported in each column. The dependent variable is the individual subject’s total
contribution during the final 60 seconds of each 2-minute period. The subject’s own and
aggregate other contributions in the initial 60 seconds in the period are used to estimate
β1 and β2. Similar results obtain when splitting the early and late parts of the period
at the 30- or 90-second mark. The coefficient estimate on subjects’ own project value
(β3) is always positive, as predicted. The top row indicates a strong and robust negative
relationship between own previous contributions and later contributions (β1), consistent
with Hypothesis 3. Moreover, the size of the β1 coefficient estimates are similar across
refund bonus treatments, particularly with alternative projects.
Table 5: Continuation Contributions - Second Half of Each Period (61-120s)
No Alternative Projects With Alternative Projects
r = 0 r = 0.1 r = 0.2 r = 0 r = 0.1 r = 0.2
β1: Own Previous -0.132** -0.109* -0.260** -0.212** -0.195** -0.231**
Contributions (1-60s) (0.037) (0.061) (0.096) (0.078) (0.067) (0.057)
β2: Others’ Previous -0.006 -0.041 -0.024 -0.009 -0.037 -0.028
Contributions (1-60s) (0.049) (0.076) (0.122) (0.108) (0.093) (0.079)
β3: Own Value 0.123* 0.186* 0.203** 0.170* 0.225** 0.212**
(0.047) (0.060) (0.038) (0.073) (0.035) (0.035)
β4: Period (t) -0.013 0.173 0.051 -0.037 0.006 0.188
(0.101) (0.248) (0.227) (0.038) (0.060) (0.087)
β0: Constant 0.072** 0.074** 0.072** 0.064** 0.072** 0.062**
(on C = 300) (0.013) (0.015) (0.018) (0.013) (0.004) (0.005)
Observations 350 280 370 370 610 720
R-squared 0.188 0.143 0.161 0.166 0.186 0.217
Individuals 40 40 40 80 80 80
Note: Only includes successfully funded projects. Individual fixed-effects regression, with standard
errors clustered by sessions (reported in parentheses). ** indicates coefficient is significantly different
from zero at the .01 level; * at .05
The aggregate contributions of others in the early part of the period also have a nega-
tive coefficient estimates (β2), but they are imprecisely estimated and are not significantly
different from zero. Hypothesis 4 predicts no relationship for the treatments without a
refund bonus r, and indeed the (β2) coefficient estimates are closest to zero for the r = 0
treatments. But the support for Hypothesis 4 is mixed due to the failure to find a sta-


































Figure 3: Cumulative Average Contributions (All Projects, No Alternative Project Avail-
able, by Funding Success)
and individual continuation contributions for the r > 0 treatments. At the same time,
we also note that since the degree of strategic substitutability directly depends on the
size of the bonus r (see (12)) it might have been particularly difficult to detect it given
the small values of r chosen and our sample size.
5.4 Contribution Dynamics
Refund bonuses provide potential contributors with a positive return even when the
provision point is not reached. Therefore, refund bonuses create an incentive to miss the
contribution target, which is also behind the strategic substitutability between others’
earlier contributions and own continuation contribution. This motivates our Conjecture
that contributions accumulate more slowly with refund bonuses. As noted earlier, to
make comparisons of equilibrium contributions across treatments, we restrict attention
to successful fundraising campaigns.
Result 6. Within the continuous time interval for project contributions, conditional
on successful fundraising, aggregate contributions accumulate more slowly when refund
bonuses are available. This contribution pattern holds with and without alternative


































Figure 4: Cumulative Average Contributions (All Projects, With Alternative Project
Available, by Funding Success)
Support. Figures 3 and 4 illustrate how the cumulative average contributions rise
across the 120-second fundraising window. The figures differentiate the successful (solid
line) and unsuccessful (dotted line) campaigns. By design, the successful campaigns reach
the threshold of 300, and the figures highlight how this often occurs through a spike of
contributions in the final seconds. In fact, the median time a successful compaign reaches
the threshold is at 119 (of the 120) seconds. Therefore, this continuous time contribution
mechanism still faces a coordination challenge, since many final contributions are effec-
tively made simultaneously. Prior to these very late contributions, the (red) top solid line
for successful campaigns without a refund bonus lies above the cumulative contributions
for the treatments with positive refund bonuses–particularly for Figure 3 in which no al-
ternative projects are available to fund. With alternatives available (Figure 4), the gap is
smaller and about 40 seconds are required before it emerges above the other treatments.
Table 6 reports a series of regressions to provide statistical support for Result 6. The
dependent variable in these regressions is the cumulative, aggregate contributions made
by all 10 group members through the first 60 seconds (Panel A) or through the first
90 seconds (Panel B) of the 120-second period. The omitted treatment condition is the
case of no refund bonuses. The negative, and often statistically significant, coefficient
estimates for the refund bonus treatment dummy variables indicate the lower cumulative
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Table 6: Early Contributions for Successful Campaigns
Panel A Total Contributions in 1-60 Secs
No Alternative Projects With Alternative Projects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dummy (bonus=0.1) -25.59 −23.27†
(22.83) (12.42)
Dummy (bonus=0.2) −32.63† -11.15
(17.07) (12.93)
Dummy (Any bonus> 0) −29.32† -17.04
(17.33) (11.09)
Period -4.61** -4.61** -5.67** -5.67**
(1.42) (1.41) (0.99) (1.01)
Constant 206.7** 206.7** 232.6** 232.9**
(19.34) (19.34) (9.80) (9.71)
Observations 100 100 170 170
R-squared 0.242 0.241 0.261 0.249
Panel B Total Contributions in 1-90 Secs
No Alternative Projects With Alternative Projects
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Dummy (bonus=0.1) -30.82 -21.74*
(20.63) (9.92)
Dummy (bonus=0.2) −32.64† -13.54
(17.43) (10.77)
Dummy (Any bonus> 0) -31.79* −17.56†
(15.40) (9.63)
Period -5.16** -5.16** -5.80** -5.80**
(1.25) (1.24) (0.95) (0.96)
Constant 249.5** 249.5** 272.3** 272.5**
(14.96) (14.87) (13.28) (13.28)
Observations 100 100 170 170
R-squared 0.281 0.281 0.262 0.261
Note: Only includes successfully funded projects. Random-effects regression, with standard
errors clustered by sessions; robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ** indicates
coefficient is significantly different from zero at the .01 level; * at .05; † at 0.10 (all two-tailed
tests).
contributions with refund bonus at these interim time points. Contributions are on
average 10 to 15 percent lower with refund bonuses at these time points.21 Note that this
21A similar set of regressions at the 30-second point also have negative coefficient estimates on the
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comparison is being made for those fundraising campaigns that were ultimately successful.
Also notable in Table 6 is the strong and robust result that contributions are lower at
these interim time points in later periods of the experiment, since the coefficient on the
period number is significantly negative. Early contributions decrease as contributors
gain more experience, even for these successful campaigns, and the flurry of final-second
contributions becomes even more pronounced in the later periods of the experiment.22
6 Conditional Cooperation
In the linear environment, scaling up to multiple projects should not have any effect on
economic outcomes when each project is considered in isolation. But as demonstrated in
Section 5.2, the addition of an alternative project for funding reduces the success rate but
only for campaigns without bonuses. In this section, we investigate further why multiple
projects can negatively affect coordination among contributors and why we obtain a
different effect of multiple projects across bonus and no bonus treatments. We will argue
that a change from a single to a multiple-project environment can make low-contribution
equilibria more focal and, in turn, lead to a lower success rate for campaigns without
bonuses.
Table 7 reveals a stark qualitative difference in contributing behavior across treat-
ments. It reports estimates of logit regressions where the dependent variable takes a
value of 1 if the subject made any contribution in the final 30 seconds of the campaign
and 0 otherwise. The key explanatory variable is the group’s total contributions made
in the first 90 seconds of the campaign, shown in the top row.23 Considerations based
only on payoff relevance would imply a negative correlation between the total contri-
bution and the likelihood of additional contributions because of the fixed threshold for
contributions. Lower early contributions require larger later contributions for success,
and vice versa. Indeed, we observe such a negative correlation for all treatments except
refund bonus dummies, but they are not statistically significant.
22Crosetto and Regner (2018) document how successful crowdfunding campaigns in practice often
have a cascade of late contributions.
23Taking the 60-second contribution cutoff makes no qualitative difference for the results.
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Table 7: Any Individual Contribution in the Last 30 seconds
With alternatives No alternatives
r = 0 r = 0.1 r = 0.2 r = 0 r = 0.1 r = 0.2
Total (1-90s) 0.005* -0.008** -0.006** -0.005** -0.003 -0.007*
Contribution (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Own value 0.027** 0.018** 0.020** 0.022** 0.016** 0.017**
(0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Period 0.053* 0.064** 0.074** 0.075** 0.066** 0.029**




Constant -3.92** 0.239 -0.257 -0.939 -0.327 0.211
(0.49) (0.724) (0.572) (0.589) (0.333) (0.445)
Observations 1,200 1,200 1,200 600 600 590
Note: Random-effects logit regressions, with standard errors clustered by sessions; robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is a binary variable that
takes a value of 1 if the subject made any contribution in the last 30 seconds of the campaign
and 0 otherwise. ** indicates coefficient is significantly different from zero at the .01 level; * at
.05; † at 0.10.
for the no bonus treatment under multiple campaigns. In this treatment (column 1), by
contrast, the significant positive correlation indicates that subjects tend to continue with
cooperation when others have sufficiently cooperated earlier in the campaign, and they
reduce cooperation otherwise.
Conditionally cooperative behavior can arise when distributional concerns or confor-
mity with social norms play a role in decision making; see, e.g., Sugden (1984), Bernheim
(1994), Bigoni et al. (2015), as well as Bøg et al. (2012) who provide empirical ev-
idence of such behavior in Internet crowdfunding. In a dynamic setting, conditionally
cooperative behavior can be sustained as an equilibrium strategy if there are multiple
equilibrium outcomes. In the campaigns without bonuses, we have efficient and ineffi-
cient (low-contribution) equilibria. Thus, the termination of cooperation conditional on
an insufficient total level of earlier cooperation is a credible threat.24 In campaigns with
refund bonuses, however, there are no low contribution equilibria. Consequently, the
24It is straightforward to formalize conditionally cooperative strategies and resultant play; see, e.g.,
Kreps et al. (1982) for an approach.
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Table 8: Frequency of Zero Individual Contributions
Design No alternatives With alternatives
r = 0 0.040 0.163
(0.008) (0.011)
r = 0.1 0.077 0.102
(0.011) (0.009)
r = 0.2 0.080 0.062
(0.011) (0.007)
Standard errors are in parentheses.
threat to discontinue cooperation is not credible as subjects would still have an incentive
to contribute because of refund bonuses.
Under single-project conditions, however, we do not observe evidence for condition-
ally cooperative behavior even for campaigns without bonuses, which suggests that low-
contribution equilibria are not focal. This is consistent with the theoretical findings of
Bagnoli and Lipman (1989) and related experimental results of Bagnoli and McKee
(1991) and Bagnoli et al. (1992). These studies considered the provision point mech-
anism with pledged contributions refunded if the threshold is not reached, but without
bonuses. Bagnoli and Lipman (1989) show that the low-contribution equilibria are not
trembling-hand perfect when trembles are restricted to undominated strategies. Indeed,
the possibility of trembles together with the security provided by refunds make agents
rationally contribute positive amounts. This reasoning, however, applies only to the
single-project case. With multiple projects, Bagnoli and Lipman (1989) argue that a
much stronger equilibrium refinement is needed to eliminate low-contribution equilibria:
successively undominated strictly perfect equilibrium. With multiple projects, individually
excessive contributions to a particular project can be rationalized on the grounds that the
failure of a single project can subsequently trigger non-cooperation in all projects. Then,
given the possibility of trembles with excessive contributions, low-contribution outcomes
become trembling-hand perfect and, as a result, can become more focal.
Experiments aimed at testing the theoretical predictions of Bagnoli and Lipman
(1989) and the role of various equilibrium refinements produce mixed evidence. For
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single projects, Bagnoli and McKee (1991) obtain strong support for trembling-hand
perfect equilibria by documenting high rates of provision and high levels of individual
contributions. For multiple projects, however, Bagnoli et al. (1992) obtain many more
instances of inefficient underprovision which led them to the conclusion that the succes-
sively undominated strictly perfect equilibrium may not be an adequate representation
of individual behavior. Importantly, recent studies (Corazzini et al. (2015); Ansink
et al. (2017)) also demonstrate a substantial drop in provision rates when multiple
projects become available for funding. All these studies suggest a greater relevance of
low-contribution equilibria under multiple-project conditions and our empirical findings
confirm this conclusion.
Finally, based on the theoretical considerations of Bagnoli and Lipman (1989) and
the aforementioned follow-up experimental studies, we would expect more occurrences of
free riding in our experiment under multiple-project conditions. Table 8 reports average
rates of complete free riding (zero individual contributions) for all bonus designs under
conditions with and without alternative projects. When only one project is available for
funding, we barely observe any free riding when no refund bonuses are offered. However,
the amount of free riding increases substantially when multiple projects become available
for funding, but only for the case of no refund bonuses.
7 Related literature
The present paper is related to the strands of literature on non-coercive methods of public
fundraising and on dynamic contribution games. The idea of using pecuniary incentives
to induce contributions appears in a number of studies. For example, in Falkinger (1996)
contributors are rewarded for above-average contributions; in Morgan (2000) contributors
are motivated by the means of lottery prizes. The advantages of the all-pay auction design
in enhancing fundraising are studied by Goeree et al. (2005). Another example is the
multi-stage mechanism of Gerber and Wichardt (2009) that pre-commits consumers
to optimal contributions with conditionally refundable deposits. See Falkinger et al.
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(2000), Morgan and Sefton (2000), Lange et al. (2007), and Corazzini et al. (2010)
for experimental evidence on the performance of these mechanisms. Dorsey (1992)
and Kurzban et al. (2001) report previous experimental studies that allow upward
revisions in pledged contributions targeting a provision point. For alternative fundraising
methods, also see Varian (1994), Kominers and Weyl (2012), and Masuda et al. (2014).
However, the practical applicability of many of these mechanisms is questionable because
of concerns over group manipulability, distributive efficiency, and, most importantly,
complexity. This perhaps explains why the simple provision point mechanism remains
the most preferred choice of practitioners.25
Our findings in the baseline (no bonus, single project) treatments show the beneficial
effects of a time window for contributions. Similarly, Bigoni et al. (2015) find higher
levels of cooperation in social dilemmas when actions are taken in continuous time. They
explain this finding by noting that in continuous time agents can react more swiftly to
instances of non-cooperative behavior.26 In general, the literature on dynamic contribu-
tion games gives mixed answers to the question of whether a time dimension facilitates
contributions. The predicted outcome crucially depends on the structural aspects of the
dynamic contribution game studied. Admati and Perry (1991) predict an inefficient
allocation of resources when contributions are made in a sequential order and are sunk
because of the opportunity to free-ride on earlier contributions. But this finding is not
robust, as they demonstrate, to the case of non-sunk costs (which limits the scope of dy-
namic free-riding), nor to the simultaneity of periodic contributions (Marx and Matthews
(2000)), nor to the asymmetry of contributors’ valuations (Compte and Jehiel (2003)).
In connection to the problem of dynamic free-riding, Battaglini et al. (2014) theoretically
and Battaglini et al. (2016) experimentally demonstrate that the irreversibility of con-
tributions is beneficial for public good outcomes, but again this result is not robust if the
25Besides simplicity, another important advantage of the provision point mechanism is its “all-or-
nothing” feature. As argued by, e.g., Kosfeld et al. (2009) and Gerber et al. (2013), minimum
participation rules can reduce the severity of the free-riding problem and so can deadlines for collaborative
projects (Bonati and Hörner (2011)).
26In contrast, in a public good environment Palfrey and Rosenthal (1994) report that repeated play
(tantamount to discrete time) results in only a modest increase in the level of coordination and cooper-
ation compared to one-shot play.
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reversibility of contributions can be used for trigger strategies overcoming the free-riding
problem (Lockwood and Thomas (2002), Matthews (2013)).
A new and rapidly growing body of literature is concerned with securities-based crowd-
funding; see Hakenes and Schlegel (2014), Da and Huang (2017), Brown and Davies
(2018), Cong and Xiao (2018), Li (2018), and Cumming and Hornuf (2018). The main
focus of this literature is on the economic mechanism of securities-based crowdfunding
often referred to as the “wisdom of the crowd.” Crowdfunding in that application serves
not only as a financing method but also as an aggregator of dispersed information to
better screen out inefficient projects. Our paper, however, does not directly relate to
this strand of literature. In donation-based crowdfunding, as generally in public good
provision, the main challenges are the problems of free riding and equilibrium coordina-
tion rather than project screening. Unlike securities-based crowdfunding, here the entire
crowd stands to benefit from the project, not only the contributors. (Think of Wikipedia
or any free web-based application.) Thus, if the crowd is large enough then the project
is likely to be efficient.
Nevertheless, the mechanism with refund bonuses can still be useful for crowdfunding
done for entrepreneurial projects. A number of papers (e.g., Belleflamme et al. (2014);
Ellman and Hurkens (2016); Strausz (2017)) study a type of crowdfunding where an
entrepreneur finances investment into a new product out of funds raised from the crowd
of consumers in return for the future delivery of the new product. The benefits of crowd-
funding include the resolution of demand uncertainty, better market adaptation, higher
profitability for entrepreneurs, wider community gains. Even though our paper does not
directly relate to this strand of literature either, we note that crowdfunding for new prod-
ucts also suffers from the public good problem. In this type of crowdfunding, the public
good is the opportunity of consumption for everyone. Those who do not participate in
crowdfunding are likely to be better-off than those who participate because the former
do not risk their funds in the case the project fails or falls short of expectations. These
free-riders can still choose to consume after all these uncertainties are resolved. (Without
such uncertainties free-riders may be worse-off, see Ellman and Hurkens (2016).)
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8 Conclusion
The main objective of this work is to investigate whether refund bonuses have a po-
tential to improve the present practice of crowdfunding for public goods. In theory
refund bonuses can help mitigate the problem of equilibrium coordination by eliminat-
ing inefficient equilibria. We test the effects of refund bonuses in an experiment using a
laboratory-based crowdfunding platform that features many important aspects of real-life
crowdfunding. Our main result is that refund bonuses help resolve the problem of equi-
librium coordination when such coordination is exacerbated by confounding factors such
as the presence of alternative projects. Furthermore, our findings also demonstrate that
refund bonuses can lead to significant economic gains even after accounting for their costs.
Overall, our findings provide further support for attempting to modify crowdfunding with
refund bonuses in the field.
In the present study, the effects of refund bonuses stem from the intensive margin of
contributing behavior within a fixed group. Crowdfunding platforms can attract thou-
sands of donors and, therefore, an equally important and practically relevant question is
if refund bonuses could have an effect on the extensive margin of contributing behavior.
From Table 8 we observe a larger amount of free riding under zero bonus conditions when
multiple projects are available for funding. This provides indirect evidence that refund
bonuses could possibly generate a larger base of donors. A field study with endogenous
participation would shed more light on this conjecture.
We show that refund bonuses can be self-sustainable by modest fee surcharges levied
from successful campaigns, and on this account smaller bonus rates can even yield better
performance. Generally, there could be various sources of refund bonuses: a third-party
donor, the campaigner’s own funds, the public authority’s contribution, etc. Arguably,
propensity to contribute may well depend on the source of refund bonuses, which requires
a fully fledged research study of its own. Furthermore, such a study could also investigate
the signaling role of refund bonuses. Specifically, refund bonuses and their size can
credibly signal important aspects of the project, e.g., its value in the case of noisy private
valuations, that can potentially help contributors better coordinate on efficient outcomes.
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The current experiment only considered only efficient projects, whose aggregate valuation
exceeded costs. Future research can explore whether refund bonuses help (or hurt) in
screening out inefficient projects that should not receive funding. This research direction
is particularly relevant from a practical perspective, as opportunism and moral hazard
are major hurdles in the development of crowdfunding. These considerations may be
important factors in the design of bonus schemes.
Our research shows the importance and effectiveness of incentives offered on the off-
the-equilibrium path. Further research could also explore other designs of such incentives
aimed at further efficiency gains. Different refund bonus designs may be more or less
appropriate for addressing different types of coordination difficulties for specific projects,
and crowdfunding platforms could offer a menu of alternatives to campaigners. For
instance, the time pattern of contributions documented in the final subsection suggests
an alternative mechanism with time-varying refund bonuses that could more effectively
promote contributions in practice. The current results indicate that contributions for
successfully funded projects accumulate more quickly in the absence of refund bonuses.
This pattern could be reversed by a new mechanism in which bonuses are only paid for
contributions made during an early phase of the contribution window. This could raise
initial phase contributions to a higher level; subsequently, later contributions during the
period would not generate additional refund bonuses and the strategic complementarity
of these contributions could push total contributions across the funding threshold.
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Appendix: Experiment Instructions 
Introduction 
This experiment is a study of group and individual decision making. The amount of money you 
earn depends partly on the decisions that you make and thus you should read the instructions 
carefully. The money you earn will be paid privately to you, in cash, at the end of the 
experiment. A research foundation has provided the funds for this study.  
The experiment is divided into many decision “rounds.” You will be paid based on your 
cumulative earnings across all rounds. Each decision you make is therefore important because it 
affects the amount of money you earn.  
In each decision round you will be grouped with 9 other people, who are sitting in this room. 
You will make decisions privately, that is, without consulting other group members. Please do 
not attempt to communicate with other participants in the room during the experiment. If you 
have a question as we read through the instructions or any time during the experiment, raise your 
hand and an experimenter will come by to answer it. 
Your earnings in the experiment are denominated in experimental dollars, which will be 
exchanged at a rate of 50 experimental dollars = 1 U.S. dollar at the end of the experiment. At 
the beginning of the experiment you are given 100 experimental dollars to start. You will add to 
this amount every round based on decisions you and others in your group make. 
Overview 
Every decision round you can allocate some experimental dollars to help fund one or two group 
projects that will benefit you and the other members of your group. If enough money is allocated 
to a project by all members of your group, the project is funded and you (and all other group 
members) will each receive an extra payment of some experimental dollars (as explained next). 
The amount of money, in total, that your group must allocate to fund any project is called the 
Threshold. This Threshold amount may be different in different rounds. 
If insufficient money is allocated to a project by all members of your group, then those who tried 
to allocate money to a project will have their proposed allocation returned. Those individuals 
who tried to allocate money to a project may also receive a refund bonus. The amount of the 
refund bonus is a fraction of the proposed amount allocated to a group project. 
Your value for the projects 
You and everyone else in your group will receive an extra payment of experimental dollars if any 
project is funded. This amount is determined randomly for each person, for each project, in each 
round, drawn from the 8001 possible values 20, 20.01, 20.02, …, 99.98, 99.99, 100. Each of 
these values between 20 and 100 experimental dollars is equally likely to be chosen for each 
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group member and project in each round. The likelihood that another group member draws any 
of these values is not affected by the value drawn by any other group member in that round, or in 
any previous or future rounds. Your values are your private information. You will know your 
own values, but you will not know the values drawn for any other group member, nor will others 
know your values. 
Your allocation decision 
The figure below presents an example screen for the case when two projects are both potentially 
funded. Everything on the left side of the screen refers to Project A and everything on the right 
side refers to Project B. When you want to make an allocation to help fund a project during a 
round you will indicate how much (in experimental dollars) you wish to allocate using the fields 
at the bottom of the screen. Any number between and including 0 up to the Threshold that the 





Proposed allocations can be made at any time while the two-minute countdown clock in a round 
(shown on the top right of the screen) is active. Your proposed allocation will immediately be 
displayed to all others in your group as soon as you click Submit, added to the list under either 
Project A or Project B along with your ID number. The ID numbers for everyone in the group 
will be randomly re-assigned each round. You can submit multiple allocations within the two-
minute time period if you wish. 
The lower part of the allocation screen shows the total allocation sum made by all group 
members, instantly updated following each new allocation. It also updates the total (summed) 
allocation made by you individually in the round so far. Your extra payment when either of the 
projects is funded is also shown in red, and note that these are different for Project A and Project 
B because they are randomly and independently drawn as explained above.  
If the total amount of money that your group allocates to fund either project (or both projects) is 
equal to or greater than the Threshold, then you and each of the other group members all receive 
an extra payment for that project drawn between 20 and 100 as explained above. If the total 
amount allocated to a project strictly exceeds the Threshold, the extra amount above the 
Threshold will not be returned to anyone. 
Computing the refund bonus 
If the total amount of money that your group allocates to fund a project is less than the 
Threshold, then no group member receives an extra payment for that project. That group project 
is not funded. All people who allocated money to that project will have their proposed allocation 
amount returned. They may also receive a refund bonus that is some amount times their proposed 
allocation to the group project. For example, in the earlier example screen the indicated refund 
bonus fraction is 0.2 and the Threshold is 120. Suppose that you allocated X to the project, and 
in total all individuals in your group (including you) allocated Y to the project. When Y<120 (so 
that the threshold to fund the project and to receive the extra payment is not met), you will 
receive 0.2 times your proposed allocation X as an extra refund bonus.  
Adding some completely hypothetical numbers to this example, suppose that you allocated X=20 
and the other members of your group allocated 90 in total. Therefore Y=20+90=110<120. You 
would receive back the X=20 you tried to allocate to the project, and would also receive a refund 
bonus of (0.2)⨯20=4 experimental dollars. Notice that individuals who tried to allocate more to 
the project get a larger refund bonus. For example, a person who tried to allocate 40 in this 
hypothetical example would receive a refund bonus of (0.2)⨯40=8 experimental dollars. 
End of the round 
At the end of every decision round, as illustrated in the figure below your computer will display 
the total amount allocated to the group projects by members of your group. The results screen 
will also display whether the project was funded, the refund bonus you receive if the group 
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project threshold is not met, and your earnings for the round. Your cumulative earnings will also 
be shown, and a table will also display the key results from every previous round. 
 
 
What might change in different rounds? 
The experimenter will make a verbal announcement when any payoff rules change during the 
experiment.  
As already noted, the Threshold may be different across rounds or for different projects. 
In some rounds the refund bonus fraction (0.2 in the earlier example) may be a different number, 
or may be 0 (giving NO REFUND BONUS) for one or both projects. 






1. You will make allocation decisions in many decision rounds. 
2. Group members’ ID labels are randomly-determined each round, and therefore typically 
change from round to round. Each group always contains the same 10 members. 
3. Group members make allocations to one or two group projects at any time (and as many 
times as they want) during the two minutes in a round. 
4. If the total amount allocated in your group is ≥ Threshold for any project, you receive an 
extra payment. The other members of your group also receive extra payments.  
5. The extra payments are drawn independently from the range between 20 and 100 
experimental dollars, and each amount in this range is equally likely. 
6. You should pay close attention to the “Total allocation so far” made to each project by 
the group. Any allocations above the Threshold needed to fund the project are wasted 
(never returned) and can only reduce your earnings. 
7. If the total amount allocated to a project is < Threshold, everyone’s proposed allocation 
to that project is returned. Everyone also receives a refund bonus that is equal to some 
fraction times his or her proposed allocation. (This fraction could be 0, providing NO 
refund bonus in some rounds for some projects.) 
8. The refund fraction can be different for different projects. 
  
